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On May 8, 1992, Robert L. Wilkins, an African-American
graduate of Harvard Law School and a public defender in
Washington, D.C., was traveling through western Maryland in a
rented red Cadillac.' Wilkins and his family were returning home
from a funeral which they had attended in Chicago. Just before
dawn, their car was stopped for speeding by Maryland State
Trooper Bryan W Hughes, who alleged that the car was traveling
60 miles per hour in a 40 miles per hour zone.' After Trooper
Hughes issued Wilkins' cousin, the driver of the car, a $105
speeding ticket, he asked the family to consent to a search of the
* Michael A. Fletcher, Driven to Extremes; Black Men Take Steps to Avoid
Police Stops, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al (discussing the measures and
precautions African-Americanmen must take in order to avoid being stopped by
the police; the term "DWB" is used by Salim Muwakkil, an African-American
academic and journalist, to refer to the police practice of targeting African-
American males for traffic violations).
"" Brooklyn Law School Class of 1998; A.B. Columbia University, 1993.
The author would like to thank Professor Susan Herman for her invaluable
guidance and suggestions in the development of this Note. In addition, the author
thanks Jennifer Gaffney for her understanding and patience.
' Paul W. Valentine, Maryland Settles Lawsuit Over Racial Profiles; Police
Allegedly Targeted Minorities for Searches, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1995, at B 1.
2 Id.
3 id.
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car.4 Wilkins responded that it was unconstitutional to search a car
without probable cause. Trooper Hughes ignored Wilkins' claim
and continued to pressure the family to consent to the search,
insisting that it was a regular practice of the Maryland State Police
to search motor vehicles.6 When the family refused, Trooper
Hughes ordered them out of the car and forced them to stand in the
rain while he summoned drug-sniffing dogs from a nearby Sheriff's
Deputy Wilkins and his family waited in the rain for over a half
an hour until the car was finally searched by the dogs; ultimately
no drugs or illegal substances were found.8
Subsequently, Wilkins and his family members filed a lawsuit
against the Maryland State Police Department.9 The Police
Department chose to settle the case, and agreed to pay Wilkins and
his family members $50,000 for damages they suffered as a result
of the incident.'° In addition to the payment of money damages,
the settlement also included a promise by the Maryland State Police
Department to cease using race as a factor in detaining motorists,
and a promise to revise its training programs to incorporate this
new policy." Despite this settlement, the Maryland State Police
Department still continues to use race as a factor in detaining and
searching motorists.1 2 A recent study by the Associated Press
revealed that African-American drivers are four times as likely to
4 Id.; Maryland State Police Settle Lawsuit Over Racial Profiles, JET, Jan.
23, 1995, at 6 [hereinafter Maryland State Police].
5 Maryland State Police, supra note 4, at 6.
6 Maryland State Police, supra note 4, at 6.
7 Tanya Jones, Race-Based Searches Prohibited, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 5,
1995, at lB.
8 id.
9 See Maryland State Police, supra note 4, at 6.
'0 See Maryland State Police, supra note 4, at 6.
" See Maryland State Police, supra note 4, at 6.
12 See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. Ruv.
425, 441 (1997) (writing that despite the settlement of the case and the promise
by the Maryland State Police Department to stop using race as a factor in




be stopped by police along sections of Interstate 95 in Maryland
than other drivers.' 3
The problem outlined above is not unique to the state of
Maryland. All over the country, African-American and other
minority motorists are stopped for traffic violations solely because
of their race.' 4 Statistics and studies comparing the percentage of
minority motorists stopped and searched in comparison to the
percentage white motorists show that police are using traffic
violations as a pretext for stopping and searching motor vehicles
driven by minorities.15 Reacting to this police practice, many
African-Americans take precautionary measures such as driving
inconspicuous cars, driving at exactly the speed limit, being
13 Michael Schneider, State Police 1-95 Drug Unit Found to Search Black
Motorists Four Times More Often Than White: Analysis Raises Questions About
Trooper Procedures, BALTIMORE SuN, May 23, 1996, at 2B. Of 145 motorists
stopped during a nine month period, 110 were black, 24 were white, 6 were
Hispanic and 5 were "other minorities." Id.
14 See, e.g, Hart Seely, Black Males Say It's Normal for Police to Find an
Excuse to Stop Their Cars and Hunt for Drugs, SYRACUSE HERALD AM., Oct.
22, 1995, at A12 (quoting Susan Horn, the Executive Director of the Hiscock
Legal Aid Society, as saying, "the police use vehicle and traffic violations all the
time as the pretext for stopping people, particularly black people, and particularly
in certain neighborhoods").
," See Patrol To Review Drug Stops, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC),
Aug. 4, 1996, at B2 (comparing the stops of motorists on Interstates 85 and 95
by the State Police Special Emphasis Team, which targets drug offenses, to stops
made by the regular highway patrol; 45% of the charges rendered by the Special
Emphasis Team were against African-Americans, whereas other troopers working
on the same highways issued only 24% of their charges against African-
Americans); Linn Washington, Jr., Racism is Driving the War on Drugs in New
Jersey, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), June 19, 1996, at 99 (stating that "Blacks
and Latinos made up nearly 75% of those subjected to 'investigative stops by
troopers on the section of the Turnpike running through Gloucester County
although these motorists made up only 13.5% of the Turnpike's annual total
drivers'); Patrick O'Driscoll, Drug Profile Lawsuit Settled; Minority Motorists
Stopped, DENVER POST, Nov. 10, 1995, at Al (revealing that the police use the
following factors in deciding whom to stop on the highway: race or ethnicity of
the driver; temporary license plates; vehicles from known drug-source states;
tinted or curtained windows; radar detectors; "visible" air fresheners; and fast-
food wrappers on the floor).
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conscious of their posture and avoiding flashy clothes or sunglasses
to avoid being targeted by police.6
The Supreme Court recently examined the constitutionality of
pretextual stops and searches where race may be involved in Whren
v. United States.' 7 The Whren Court held that so long as the
police have probable cause to stop a motorist (including police
officers witnessing what they believe is a traffic violation), the stop
is justified under the Fourth Amendment 8 even if the officer
considers the race of the driver in deciding whether to stop the
vehicle.' 9 While the Supreme Court in Whren analyzed whether
pretextual stops were improper under the Fourth Amendment,2"
the Court has never addressed the practice of stopping motorists on
16 See Fletcher, supra note *, at Al.
17 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
" The Fourth Amendment protects citizens' privacy by forbidding the
government to partakein arbitrary searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV
("The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.... ").
See Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)
(asserting that "[t]he basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment ... is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials").
19 Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
20 Id. Relying on Whren, the Supreme Court recently held that the Fourth
Amendment does not require that a lawfully seized defendant be advised that he
or she is "free to go" before a defendant's consent to a search will be recognized
as voluntary. See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996). Robinette involved
a case in which the defendant was stopped for traveling 69 miles per hour in a
45 miles per hour zone. Id. Upon being stopped, a police officer conducted a
computer check of the defendant which indicated no prior violations. Id. The
officer then asked the defendant if he had any drugs or illegal substances in the
car. The defendant said that he did not. Id. The officer then asked the defendant
if he could search the car. Id. The defendant said yes and the search turned up
a small amount of marijuana and a pill of methylenedioxymethamphetamine
(MDMA), commonly known as ecstasy. Id. Robinette was subsequently arrested
and charged with "knowing possession of a controlled substance." Id. The
Supreme Court held that the consent to the search was voluntary despite the lack
of a warning by the police to the defendant that he was not required to consent
to the search. Id. at 419-21. Further, the Supreme Court held that the stop was
authorized under Whren. Id.
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the basis of race under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2'
This Note argues that the Equal Protection Clause should
prevent the police from considering the race of a motorist when
deciding whom to detain for a traffic violation. However, in reality,
the Equal Protection Clause offers little protection against such
police activity since the Supreme Court requires claimants meet an
onerous test for establishing an equal protection violation.22 For
example, under the Court's traditional test, a claimant has the
burden of proving that the police intended to discriminate. Since a
claimant is unlikely to find proof which would satisfy this burden,
the claimant's equal protection argument is likely to fail.23 In
order to solve this problem, courts should abandon the traditional
equal protection test with respect to pretextual traffic stops and
should institute a less burdensome analysis.'
Part I of this Note discusses in detail how the police use race
as a factor in deciding whom to pull over for traffic violations and
the effect this practice has on minorities. Part II comments on why
the Equal Protection Clause will not protect against the consider-
ation of race by police in making their decisions. First, this section
sets out the requirements necessary to demonstrate a violation of
equal protection. The remainder of the section discusses the
difficulties of establishing an equal protection violation under the
traditional test, particularly with regard to proving discriminatory
intent by the police officer making the stop. Part III argues that
courts should adopt a new equal protection test for analyzing
21 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22 See infra Part II.B for a detailed discussion of the elements courts require
to establish an equal protection violation.
2 See infra Part II.C for a detailed discussion of why it is so difficult to
prove discriminatory intent in pretextual traffic stops. First, there usually is no
admission by a police officer that he or she detained a motorist because of his
or her race. See infra Part II.C. 1. Second, statistics have not proven to be
effective measures to establish discriminatory intent. See infra Part I1.C.2.
24 See infra Part III for an examination of the ways in which equal
protection analysis could be adapted so as to reflect upon modem forms of
racism.
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consideration of race by police in detaining motorists for traffic
violations. One possible solution is for courts to adopt the test laid
out in Batson v. Kentucky, 5where the Supreme Court lessened the
burden of establishing an equal protection violation with respect to
the use of race as a factor in making peremptory challenges during
jury selection. Another solution is to re-evaluate the discriminatory
intent requirement in the equal protection test as suggested by
Charles Lawrence in his article entitled The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism.26
I. POLICE USE OF RACE AS A FACTOR IN DETAINING
MOTORISTS FOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS
It has become apparent that all across the country police have
instituted a new policy to fight the war on crime. This policy
involves stopping motorists for traffic violations on the basis of the
motorists' race.21 Studies reveal that the percentage of minority
drivers being stopped by police for traffic violations far exceeds the
percentage of white drivers being stopped.28 In New Jersey, 75%
of drivers stopped for investigation on portions of the New Jersey
Turnpike are African-Americans and Latinos, yet this group only
25 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
26 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
27 See David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural
Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 249-50 (1994)
(writing that defendants' claims that they are stopped by police because of their
race are not treated fairly in the criminal context). See also A CCLU Idea That
Goes Too Far, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 30, 1994, at A10 (writing that police
officers in Avon, CT, a primarily white community, were supposedly ordered by
supervisors to stop black and Latino drivers); Activists Laud Ruling on Cops'
Race-Targeting, THE RECORD (Northern NJ), Mar. 10, 1996, at A17 (citing a
court ruling that criticized New Jersey state troopers for targeting minority
motorists for traffic stops because of their appearance); Kris Antonelli, State
Police Deny Bias, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 11, 1997, at 1B (citing Deborah Jeon,
a lawyer with the ACLU, as having knowledge that internal memos from high-
ranking officials within the Maryland State Police Department admit that there
is a problem within the police department of stopping and searching a
disproportionate number of black motorists).
28 See supra note 15 (listing statistics for various racial groups).
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makes up 13.5% of the annual drivers on the Turnpike.29 Minority
drivers traveling through the suburbs of Texas' major cities are
twice as likely to receive tickets for traffic violations than are white
drivers.3 ° On portions of Interstate 95 in Maryland, 71% of the
motorists stopped and searched in the first nine months of 1995
were African-Americans.31 In one Florida county, 62% of the
drivers stopped were minorities, and on an interstate in Colorado,
190 of 200 stops "targeted minorities., 32 These statistics clearly
indicate that minorities are disproportionately being stopped by
police. The inference to be drawn from this is that police are using
race as a factor in deciding whom to stop for traffic violations.33
The stop of the motor vehicle by police is often the first in a
series of events which adversely affects the motorist.34 In fact,
what occurs after the stop is often more objectionable than the stop
itself. In most cases the motorist is not even issued a ticket for a
29 Washington, supra note 15, at 99.
30 Dianna Hunt, Ticket to Trouble/Wheels of Injustice/Certain Areas are
Ticket Traps for Minorities, Hous. CHRON., May 14, 1995, at 1.
"' Fletcher, supra note *, at Al.
32 CBS EveningNews: Police Appear to Target Minorities in Effort to Catch
Criminals (CBS television broadcast, May 22, 1996).
13 Greg Williams, Selective Targeting in Law Enforcement, 10 NAT'L B.
ASS'N MAG. 18, 20 (Mar.-Apr. 1996) (discussing specificallythe police practices
in Gloucester County, N.J. and Volusia County, Fla. and asserting that "[e]xami-
nation of the disproportionate statistics relating to African American motorists
stopped versus others stopped by the two highway law enforcement units, shows
convincing evidence that African Americans were the prime target of the police
agencies involved").
It should be noted that the other inference to be drawn from these statistics
is that minorities commit more traffic violations than non-minority drivers.
However, additional statistics prove such an inference incorrect. For example,
one study revealed that 75% of the cars on the New Jersey Turnpike exceeded
the speed limit and only 2% of those speeding cars were driven by African-
Americans. See Washington, supra note 15, at 99.
3" For example, after the motorist is stopped by police, the police may then
search the car and have the discretion to decide whether or not to arrest the
motorist depending on the severity of the traffic infraction. See, e.g, Whren v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (after a motorist was stopped for a traffic
violation and his car was searched, all occupants were subsequently arrested for
possession of illegal substances).
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traffic violation,35 but instead police use the stop as an opportunity
to search the vehicle for contraband and illegal substances.36
Police target minorities for these stops because they feel they have
a greater chance of discovering illegal activity.3" Drug courier
profiles commonly include a racial component and police often
believe that minorities are more likely to be drug couriers than are
whites.3" Further, many police officers believe that minorities have
a greater propensity to commit crimes. Evidence reveals that
officers rely on this belief when deciding whom to detain.39 Thus,
the primary motivation behind the initial stop is the hope that a
" See Rudovsky, supra note 27, at 250-51 (revealing that in Volusia County,
Florida on Interstate 95, 70% of the cars stopped by police were driven by
African-Americans or Latinos; 80% of those vehicles searched were driven by
African-Americans or Latinos; and only 1% of those drivers stopped received a
ticket for a traffic violation).
36 See Rudovsky, supra note 27, at 249 (asserting that stops for traffic
violations are a way for police to search a driver's car either through consent,
probable cause, plain view or other justifications for search and seizure).
" Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of the Justice System on
the Status of African-American Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP. U. L.
REv. 23, 30 (1994) (writing that "[t]he 'war on drugs' has almost become
synonymous with policing the African-American community and black males").
3 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE
L.J. 214, 233-36 (1983) (writing that race is a clearly identified component of
the drug courier profile); Williams, supra note 33, at 21 (revealing that Sheriff
Vogel of Volusia County, Florida instructed his Selective Enforcement team to
look for cars in which "African American and Hispanic motorists [were]
traveling" in the Team's quest for drug busts).
" See United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1973). In
Mallides, a case involving an appeal of a conviction for aiding and abetting
illegal entry of aliens, the arresting officer admitted that he stopped all cars with
Mexican-appearingpeople in them. Id. See also Johnson, supra note 38, at 236
(discussing the racial component of the drug courier profile used by law enforce-
ment officials); Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy
of Fourth Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of
Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 151, 210-11 (1994) ("Black men are
often labeled and treated as criminals by police, even where no criminal activity
is suspected.. . . Police perceive blacks as more prone to criminal activity. They
find blacks more dangerous and, in other ways, easier prey for police excesses.").
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subsequent search will lead to an arrest, prosecution and conviction
for a crime other than a traffic violation.40
Beyond criminal convictions, traffic stops may also lead to
other positive results for the police. For example, police have an
incentive to stop motorists in order to seize large amounts of
money and property through civil forfeitures.41 In Florida, the
Sheriff's Department in Volusia County has confiscated approxi-
mately $8 million in cash over the past few years, all of which is
believed to be narcotics money.42 The Sheriff's Department has
expressly stated that its objective is to seize cash.43 In order to
meet this objective, the police generally stop a greater amount of
cars traveling southbound on Interstate 95 because those cars are
sometimes stocked with cash to purchase illegal substances." The
40 These stops can also lead to more harmful results, including death. For
example, on October 24, 1996, in St. Petersburg, Florida, police stopped an 18
year old African-American male for speeding. See Mike Clary, Florida City
Officials Urge Calm, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1996, at A9. While the facts after the
stop were disputed, the end result was that the motorist was shot three times by
the police and killed. Peter E. Howard, St. Pete Shooting Sparks Violence,
TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 25, 1996, at 1. The police claimed that the motorist refused
to obey their verbal commands and that his car lurched forward. Florida State
of Emergency/Shaky Calm Restored After Killing of Motorist, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Oct. 26, 1996, at A13. Witnesses, on the other hand, claimed that the motorist
had his hands up, with his foot on the brake and the car in gear. Id. The police
ordered him out of the car and as he responded the car moved forward and the
police proceeded to shoot him three times. Id.
41 See LEONARD W. LEVY, A LIcENSE TO STEAL 1 (1996).
A forfeiture is the uncompensated government confiscation of property
illegally acquired or used .... The law allows the government to seize
and confiscate the property of people suspected of some crime, though
they may never be tried or, if tried, may be acquitted. The promise of
forfeiture lures officers to seize what they can, because they are able
to keep for law enforcement purposes most of what they seize, or they
can use the assets for whatever they need - weapons, helicopters,
cellular phones, salary increases, bulletproof vests, or new police cars
with which to conduct the war against crime.
Id. at 1.
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cars going northbound, however, are not stopped as often because
if drug sales have already taken place, those cars would carry
drugs, not cash.45 Hence, the police are encouraged to use traffic
stops as a way to achieve objectives other than the enforcement of
traffic laws.
Moreover, the courts have given police the authority, under the
Fourth Amendment, to use traffic violations as a legitimate reason
to stop and search a motorist's car. As a result, police have been
allowed to accomplish hidden objectives through pretextual traffic
stops. Police authority during traffic stops was most recently upheld
in Whren v United States, where the Supreme Court held that
evidence of illegal drugs obtained by District of Columbia Police
during a traffic stop search of petitioners' car was admissible in a
trial for illegal possession of narcotics.47 Petitioners argued that
the police did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
believe that the petitioners were involved in illegal drug activity
and thus, the search of their car violated their Fourth Amendment
rights.4" Petitioners further argued that the police used the alleged
traffic violations as a pretext in order to stop and search their car
and that their race was the true motivation behind the stop.49
The Court rejected petitioners' arguments, asserting that the
reasonableness of the stop does not depend upon the motivations of
the individual police officer."0 The Court also refused to adopt a
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996) ("[A] traffic stop is valid under the
Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the
police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment
violation has occurred or is occurring. It is also irrelevant ... that the officer
may have had other subjective motives for stopping the vehicle."); Ruvalcaba v.
City of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We hold that once
a police officer has lawfully stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer
may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment and despite the absence of probable
cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, order all occupants of the
vehicle to step outside.").
47 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (1996).
41 Id. at 1772-73.
41 Id. at 1773.
5o Id. at 1774.
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test that would ask whether a "reasonable officer" would have
chosen to stop the vehicle in order to enforce traffic laws.5"
Instead, the Court held that a motorist can be detained by police
when the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred. 2 The Court ultimately upheld the admissi-
bility of evidence seized during the stop and suggested that if
petitioners wanted to attack the police officers' use of race in the
stop, they would have to use the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment.53
Whren grants the police authority, through the Fourth
Amendment, to use traffic violations as a means to search vehicles
for evidence of illegal activity. Therefore, as one commentator
noted:
[A]s long as there was cause for the police action, it does
not matter that the police were using their powers as a
pretext to conduct a drug investigation that was at the time
unsupported by cause or suspicion.. . . It does not matter
that the ultimate purpose of the police action has nothing
to do with the "legal" reason for the intrusion and every-
thing to do with the search for drugs. 4
However, Whren has left open the question of whether detaining
motorists for traffic violations on the basis of race violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.55
" Id. at 1775-76.
32 Id. at 1772 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979)).
" The Court ultimately upheld the conviction of petitioners. Further, the
Court did not address whether the stop of petitioners by police would have been
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause since petitioners did not raise
the issue on appeal. Id. at 1774, 1777.
14 See Rudovsky, supra note 27, at 251.
" Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1174 (stating that "the Constitution prohibits
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race" and that
the appropriate remedy for this problem would be the Equal Protection Clause,
not the Fourth Amendment). Although not mentioned by the Whren Court,
another option claimants have to attack the use of race by police in detaining
motorists for traffic violations is to look to independent state constitutional
grounds. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). States are required at a
minimum to afford their citizens with essentially all of the guarantees offered by
the Bill of Rights "according to the same standards that protect those personal
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II. THE INSURMOUNTABLE EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARD
A. The Equal Protection Clause Should Prevent the Police
From Detaining Motorists on the Basis of Race
The Equal Protection Clause states that no state shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws"56 and has generally been interpreted to ensure that similarly
situated people are treated alike under the law.57 Equal protection
rights against federal encroachment." Id at 10-11. However, the states do have
the option of providing greater protections to their citizens through their own
state constitutions, even where the text of the state constitutional provision is
identical to the Federal Bill of Rights. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1040-41 (1983) (stating that federal courts will not review state court decisions
which are based only upon state law and state constitutional interpretation
because federal courts have no jurisdiction over these claims).
Therefore, claimants wishing to assert that a police officer stopped a
motorist for a traffic violation because of the motorist's race, would argue that
such a stop is unreasonable under the state's search and seizure constitutional
provisions. In essence, claimants in this situation would be urging states to reject
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Whren. For example, in People
v. Brewer, 1997 WL 453677, the defendants, who were charged with possession
of a weapon in the third degree after being stopped for a traffic violation, argued
that the police stop was pretextual and that New York should not follow Whren
and thus should declare the stop unconstitutional. Id. at * 1. The court agreed
with the defendants that the stop was pretextual but held that a lower court judge
does not have the authority to interpret the New York State Constitution to
provide greater rights to its citizens than the Whren interpretation. Id. at *4.
However, a few states have opted to follow Whren, thereby foreclosing any
potential arguments based on independent state constitutional grounds. See, e.g.,
Russell v. United States, 687 A.2d 213, 214 (D.C. 1997); Petrel v. State, 675
So.2d 1049 (Fla. 1996); People v. Thompson, 283 Ill. App.3d 796, 798 (Ill.
1996); State v. Hollins, 672 N.E.2d 427, 430 (Ind. 1996); State v. Predka, 555
N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa 1996); State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Minn.
1997); Gama v. State, 920 P.2d 1010 (Nev. 996); State v. McCall, 929 S.W.2d
601 (Tex. 1996).
56 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57 See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 601 (12th ed. 1991). See
also Strander v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879) (asserting that equal
protection should guarantee that the laws of the states be the same for blacks as
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forbids classifications within laws, particularly those based on race,
and seeks to remedy forms of discrimination."
As noted, the police practice of stopping motorists on the basis
of race often leads to searches, seizures, arrests and other incidents
within the criminal justice system. 9 Typically, these acts of
they are for whites).
5 The Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause were
designed to protect minorities from being victim to discriminatory acts, such as
being stopped by police for traffic violations, because of their race. Eugene
Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv.
1323, 1325-28 (1952). On July 28, 1868 the United States Constitution was
amended to include the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment
was passed after the Civil War and in response to the inadequacy of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. The Amendment
was geared to nationalize civil rights and to ensure that African-American
citizens were afforded adequate and equal protection of the law. Id. at 1325. The
Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases explained the purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause: "The existence of laws in the States where the newly
emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and
hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this clause, and
by it such laws are forbidden." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (holding that
Louisiana's grant of a monopoly to a particular company for all New Orleans-
area slaughter-houses was not a violation of equal protection).
Throughout history, the Supreme Court has turned to the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to prevent racial discrimination. In Strauder v. West Virginia,
Justice Strong, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court stated "What is
[equal protection] but declaring .... in regard to the colored race, for whose
protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall
be made against them by law because of their color?" 100 U.S. 303, 306-07
(1879). In Korematsu v. United States, the Court held that "all legal restric-
tions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect." 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The Supreme Court in Washington v.
Davis stated "The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on
the basis of race." 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Thus, the historical development
of the Equal Protection Clause demonstrates that the Clause was designed to
prevent harmful race-based classifications and was intended to prevent
discriminatory practices such as police choosing to detain motorists for traffic
violations based upon their race.
'9 See supra Part I (discussing pretextual stops as a way to search the
motorist's car for evidence of other illegal activity, particularly possession of
drugs).
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discrimination have been attacked under the guise of the Fourth
Amendment.6 ° Claimants argue that the stop was not justified or
that the evidence seized is not admissible under the Fourth
Amendment.6' This approach has not been successful, particularly
in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Whren.62
The Equal Protection Clause, however, offers an alternative
argument for minority motorists who are detained by police
because of their race. While the Fourth Amendment was designed
to deal with issues surrounding "privacy and personal security,, 63
the Equal Protection Clause was designed to prevent discrimination
by the State." If a police officer selectively enforces traffic laws
in order to search a minority motorist's car, he has discriminated
against the minority motorist. Thus, the focus of the motorist's
legal claims should be on the actual selection process used by
police in deciding to stop him rather than the search of his car after
the stop.
65
60 See, e.g, Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774 (stating that despite petitioners'
arguments that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police stopped
them for a traffic violation because of their race, such police conduct should be
attacked under the Equal Protection Clause).
61 See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 788 F. Supp. 966 (1992), aff'd, 16 F.3d
109 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 900 (1994) (where defendant filed a
motion to suppress contraband [under the Fourth Amendment] seized by a police
officer when defendant was stopped by police for driving 68 miles per -hour in
a 65 mile per hour zone and for equipment violations).
62 Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774. Although Whren was decided recently, it has
been followed throughout the federal and state courts. See supra note 55 and
accompanying text discussing states which have followed Whren. Whren was
recently upheld in Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996). See supra note 20
for a detailed discussion of Robinette.
63 Robert Alan Culp, The Immigration and Naturalization Service and
Racially Motivated Questioning: Does Equal Protection Pick Up Where the
Fourth Amendment Left OffP, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 800, 805 (1986) (arguing that
the Fourth Amendment is concerned with the intrusion of a citizen's physical
privacy and the level of intrusion as opposed to the Equal Protection Clause
which attempts to minimize the repercussions of being classified and distin-
guished as a member of a group).
64 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
65 Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1774 (asserting that pretextual stop claims should be
attacked under the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment).
304
DRIVING WHILE BLACK
When police use race in the selection process of whom to stop
for a traffic violation, they devise two sets of traffic laws - one
set more stringent and vigorous, which is applied to minorities, and
one set more lenient and forbearing, which is applied to whites.66
The Equal Protection Clause does not permit such race-based
classifications. The Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia
announced that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause were "declaring that the laws in the States shall
be the same for the black as for the white .. ,,. Based on this
finding, the Equal Protection Clause should be applied so as to
discontinue the police practice of having one set of traffic regula-
tions for white drivers and another set for minority drivers.
B. The Traditional Equal Protection Test and Detaining
Motorists on the Basis of Race
The Equal Protection Clause seeks to prevent the use of racial
classifications in the application of laws6" and therefore, it should
prevent the police from applying traffic laws only to members of
certain races. In order to establish an equal protection violation, a
claimant must prove several elements. First, the Fourteenth
Amendment has generally been interpreted to apply only when state
action is present."' An act between two private individuals is not
66 See infra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Keith's
dissent in United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1994) in which Judge
Keith argues that the court's failure to condemn discrimination by police officers
in a traffic stop has resulted in the creation of two sets of traffic laws, one for
whites and one for minorities).
67 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879) (holding that a
West Virginia statute which made only white males of twenty-one years of age
and above eligible to serve as jurors violated equal protection because it
discriminated against African-Americans).
68 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(articulating that the Equal Protection Clause is designed to curtail classifications
of citizens, particularly those based on race).
69 See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-11 (1883) (finding the
1875 Civil Rights Act, which required equal accessto inns, public transportation,
theaters and other public places be granted regardless of race, unconstitutional
because it sought to regulate private action).
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usually protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but where the
State is involved, the protections of the Amendment can be
invoked.7" When arguing that the Equal Protection Clause prohi-
bits police from using race in their decisions to stop motorists for
traffic violations, a claimant must show that enforcement of traffic
laws by the police is state action.7' The Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Jennings held that "[l]aw enforcement is quintessential
official conduct - the police function being 'one of basic functions
of government. "72 Using this precedent, a claimant easily satisfies
the first element of an equal protection claim, that state action be
involved.
After establishing state action, a claimant must show that the act
intentionally discriminates on its face or in its application.73
Where the act expressly discriminates against a particular group, it
is considered discriminatory on its face.74 If the act does not call
for discrimination against a certain group, but when executed,
results in singling out a certain group, the act discriminates in its
application.75 If the act discriminates on its face, the Court will
not require a claimant to show discriminatory impact.76 The mere
risk of discriminatory impact is sufficient because intentional
discrimination is expressed in the act itself.77 If the act discrim-
70 See, e.g, id. at 11.
71 See, e.g., id at 10 (requiring that state action be involved for there to be
a violation of equal protection).
72 985 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Folie v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291,
297 (1978)).
71 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886) (finding that a San
Francisco ordinance prohibiting hand laundries from operating in wood buildings
without the consent of the Board of Supervisors violated equal protection because
its application was discriminatory in that the Board granted operational permits
to all non-Chinese laundries except one, and nearly all 200 Chinese laundry
applications were denied); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)
(holding a statute that limits eligible jury members to white males age twenty-
one and older discriminatory on its face).
"4 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
71 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368.
76 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
77 Id. at 309-10 (claimant not required to show that blacks would have been
selected to the jury if the statute disqualifying them was not enforced).
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inates in its application, however, a claimant must prove intentional
discrimination.7 Since intent is not explicit in application cases,
a claimant must rely on discriminatory impact as well as other
factors in proving intent.79
The practice of stopping motorists for traffic infractions, on its
face, is a neutral act." A constitutional problem arises, however,
where the police apply the traffic laws in a discriminatory manner
by considering a motorist's race in deciding whether to stop him.
Generally, police end up targeting African-Americans and other
minority motorists for traffic violations.81 Since this policy applies
the traffic laws in a discriminatory manner, a motorist bringing an
equal protection claim must show that the stop was carried out with
an intent to discriminate. 2 This requirement was established in
Washington v. Davis where the Supreme Court decided that the
District of Columbia Police Department's requirement that all job
applicants pass a written test did not violate equal protection merely
because African-Americans failed the test four times as frequently
as whites.83 The Supreme Court held that a showing of discrimi-
natory impact was only a factor in determining intent and that it
was insufficient by itself to prove discriminatory intent.8 4
After Washington, the Supreme Court further clarified how to
establish discriminatory intent. In Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, the Supreme
Court held that intentional discrimination can be found when race
was a motivating factor in the act, and discrimination need not be
78 See, e.g., Washingtonv. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-43 (requiring claimants
to prove discriminatory intent in order to establish that a policy, discriminatory
in its application, violates the Equal Protection Clause).
79 Id.
8o Cf Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308 (holding that the statute which disqualifies
blacks from serving as jurors discriminates on it face).
", See Davis, supra note 12, at 427-28 (asserting that the discretion granted
to police in detaining motorists for traffic violations lends itself to the police
practice of using race as a factor in deciding whom to detain).
82 Washington, 426 U.S. at 240-43.
3 Id. at 245-47.
4 Id. at 246.
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the act's sole purpose.'5 The Court suggested that in order to
discern discriminatory intent the following factors should be
considered: impact of official action; historical background of
decision; specific sequence of events leading up to the decision;
procedural or substantive departures from the norm in connection
with the decision or action; and legislative or administrative
history.8 6 However, the broad interpretation of Arlington Heights
was narrowed in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney.8 7 There, the Supreme Court decided that the state actor
must have "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group.""8 Feeney implies that intentional
discrimination is present when the use of race is the primary
motivating factor behind the action. Thus, in order to establish that
the use of race in stopping a motorist for a traffic violation is
intentional discrimination, the motorist must show that race was the
primary motivating factor behind the stop.89
Obviously, the best way to establish that race was the primary
motivating factor is with an admission by the officer that the
motorist was targeted because of his or her race. But more than
likely, this type of evidence will not be readily available.9"
" 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (finding that a village's denial of a
developer's request to have land rezoned for residential mixed-income
development did not violate equal protection because there was no intentional
discrimination and the denial was not based on racial reasons; claimants had
argued that the village's refusal to rezone the land was racially discriminatory
because the land was to be developed into racially integrated low income
housing).
86 Id. at 266-68.
17 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that a Massachusetts civil service statute
which afforded a hiring preference to any veteran who passed a competitive
exam did not deprive women of equal protection despite claims by petitioner that
this statute discriminated against women because 98% of veterans were male).
88 Id. at 279.
'9 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976).
'0 See Randall S. Susskind, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and
Seizure, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 327, 341 (1994) (asserting that "[t]he problem
with trying to prove that police officers treat racial minorities differently is that
it is almost impossible to find concrete evidence of the discrimination" and that
police officers and judges rarely admit when race is used as a factor in the
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Officers will instead suggest that the motorist was chosen based on
other factors such as the type of car being driven, the age of the
car, temporary license plates, cars traveling or having license plates
from known drug-source states, tinted windows, or radar detec-
tors.9'
Other than an admission by the police officer, the strongest
evidence of discriminatory intent in these cases is statistics which
demonstrate that minorities are disproportionately stopped by police
for traffic violations. Using statistics as circumstantial evidence will
allow a strong inference that police are using race as the primary
motivating factor in deciding whom to stop for a traffic viola-
tion.92 Yet, there is some question as to whether claimants will
either have the cooperation of police departments in obtaining
statistical information or will have the resources to gather such
evidence.93 Further, there is no clear indication that courts will
simply accept statistical information as a valid indication of
discriminatory intent.94
Controversy has arisen as to whether or not courts will accept
statistical data as an indication of discriminatory intent.95
decision-making process).
9' See O'Driscoll, supra note 15, at Al (citing these factors as elements that
police consider in deciding whom to stop for a traffic violation).
92 See Henry Pierson Curtis, Statistics Show Pattern of Discrimination,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 1992, at All (writing that statistics show that a
disproportionate number of blacks and Latinos are targeted for traffic stops and
thus is evidence of discriminatory and racist policies by the Volusia County
Sheriffs Department); State to Challenge Ruling Troopers TargetedDrivers, THE
RECORD, (Northern NJ), May 2, 1996, at A3 (reporting that a state court judge
relied on statistics in his decision that state troopers targeted minority motorists
for traffic stops on the New Jersey Turnpike).
" See Fletcher, supra note *, at Al (stating that there are no national
statistics comparing the number of minorities stopped for traffic violations in
comparison to white drivers). See also Hunt, supra note 30, at 1 (discussing the
difficulty in obtaining statistics from the Texas Department of Public Safety
concerning minorities and traffic violations).
9' See United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 966 (1997) (refusing to consider the arresting officer's past history of
stopping motorists on the basis of race).
95 In other circumstances, courts have rejected the use of statistics to prove
discriminatory intent. The most famous example is the Baldus study used by the
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Although use of statistical evidence has become commonplace in
modem equal protection cases, there is some question as to the
weight the courts will give this type of evidence.96 In Batson v.
Kentucky, the Supreme Court allowed statistical proof to show
discriminatory intent on the part of Kentucky prosecutors in their
use of peremptory strikes to remove African-American jurors from
cases where the defendants were African-Americans.97 Statistical
petitioner in McCleskey v. Kemp in his attempt to prove that Georgia's use of the
death penalty violated the Equal Protection Clause. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). A
summary of the report states:
Death was imposed in 34% of the white-victim cases but only in 14%
of similarly aggravated black-victim cases. The odds of receiving a
death sentence in a white-victim case was 4.3 times greater than the
odds of receiving a death sentence in a comparable black-victim case.
Nearly six of every 10 defendants who were sentenced to death for
killing white victims would not have been sentenced to death had their
victims been black. Nearly 90% of those executed since 1977 were
convicted of murdering whites, while in the same period, almost half
of the homicide victims were black. In the same period of time, all
seven of the persons executed in Georgia were convicted of killing
whites. Six of the seven executed were black.
Georgia and the Nation, RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (ACLU/Capital
Punishment, New York, N.Y.), Fall 1987, at 1-2. The Court found this study
unconvincing and held that the study was insufficient to support an inference that
any of the decisionmakers in the Georgia State Legislature acted with a
discriminatory purpose. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297. The Supreme Court was
unable to find any evidence that the Georgia State Legislature adopted the death
penalty because it intended to discriminate against blacks or that the Legislature
maintained the death penalty because of its discriminatory impact. Id. at 298.
Another Supreme Court decision that refused to grant statistics significant
weight was United States v. Armstrong. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996). There, in a
selective-prosecution claim, the defendant offered a study which showed that of
the 24 cases involving similar drug charges that the federal public defender's
office had closed in the past year, the defendant was black in every case. Id. at
1483. The Supreme Court dismissed such statistics for a lack of sufficiency. Id.
at 1488.
96 See generally Julia Lamber, Barbara Reskin & Terry Morehead Dworkin,
The Relevance of Statistics to Prove Discrimination: A Typology, 34 HASTINGS
L.J. 553, 554-55 (1983). See infra note 128 for a discussion of intentional
discrimination and the use of statistics in Title VII cases.
17 476 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1986).
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evidence was also accepted in Rogers v. Lodge in order to show
discriminatory purpose in a voting rights case.9" There, an at-large
voting scheme was found to be unconstitutional since under that
system no African-American had ever been elected to office."
The Supreme Court held that a discriminatory intent can be
surmised from circumstantial evidence and from a "totality of
circumstances."' ° While the court accepted statistics as an
indicator of discriminatory intent in those cases, in the more typical
case, courts may not find statistics as persuasive.' However, in
evaluating statistics courts should bare in mind that statistics may
be the only way to prove "the concealed nature of most discrimi-
natory acts."'0 2
Just as there are instances where the court has found that
statistics indicate discriminatory intent, there are examples where
courts have discerned discriminatory intent where a law or policy
promotes stereotypes. °3  Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, stated
"[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.
Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in
fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of
racial hostility."'0 4 The Supreme Court also held in Edmonson V.
98 458 U.S. 613, 624-27 (1982).
99 Id.
too Id.
"' See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's ruling in Washington v. Davis that statistics and discriminatory intent
alone is not enough to prove intentional discrimination). See also supra note 95
and accompanying text (referring to instances where the Supreme Court has not
been persuaded by statistics); infra Part IH.C.2 (discussing specificallyhow courts
have found statistics insufficient to prove intentional discrimination).
102 See Lamber, supra note 96, at 554 (discussing how litigants have come
to rely on using indirect and circumstantial evidence, including statistics, to prove
discrimination).
'03 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 404-05 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) ("[R]acial and ethnic distinctions where they are stereotypes are
inherently suspect and call for judicial scrutiny .... ).
"04 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (holding that minority set asides in government
contracts violated equal protection).
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Leesville Concrete Company that "[i]f our society is to continue to
progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the
automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and
causes continued hurt and injury."'0 5 Thus, the Court is unlikely
to uphold state action which perpetuates negative stereotypes."0 6
The Supreme Court should take note that when police use race
to decide whom to detain for a traffic violation, stereotypes are
perpetuated. By singling out selected groups for traffic stops, the
police are not only basing their decisions on stereotypes, but they
are also promoting stereotypes.0 7 As discussed previously, police
stop minorities because of drug courier profiles and because they
believe that minorities have a greater propensity to commit
crimes.' .8 This practice perpetuates stereotypes since the public
may become convinced that minorities violate traffic laws more
often than whites and have a greater propensity to commit
crimes.0 9 The perpetuation of these stereotypes should be one of
the factors courts consider in determining whether police acted with
an intent to discriminate when they stopped minority drivers for
traffic violations.
105 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991).
106 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) ("[T]he exercise of a
peremptory challenge must not be based on either the race of the juror or the
racial stereotypes held by the party."); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104
(1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that "the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits a State from taking any action based on crude, inaccurate racial
stereotypes").
107 See Development in the Law - Race and the Criminal Process, Racial
Discrimination on the Beat: Extending the Racial Critique to Police Conduct,
101 HARv. L. REV. 1494, 1508 (1988) [hereinafter Development in the Law]
(asserting that the use of race by police in detaining suspects sets up a self-
fulfilling prophecy: "racial stereotypes influence police to arrest minorities more
frequently than nonminorities, thereby generating statistically disparate arrest
patterns that in turn form the basis for further selectivity").
10' See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing the racial
component of the drug courier profile and the stereotype that minorities commit
more crimes).
'09 See Development in the Law, supra note 107, at 1509 (stating that arrest
statistics which show that minorities are arrested for more crimes "reinforce




If a claimant establishes discriminatory intent by the state, the
court must then decide what level of review it will apply to the
state action. When the action involves a "suspect classification,"
such as a classification based on race, then the action will be
subjected to "strict scrutiny.' ' ° In order to survive strict scrutiny,
the state must show that the particular action meets a compelling
state interest and is narrowly tailored to solve the pending
problem."' The state is required to prove that not only is the law
or policy necessary for the good of society, but that there is no
other legitimate means of achieving the purpose." 2 If the state is
able to justify its action as serving a compelling state interest and
as being narrowly tailored, then the law or policy will be found
constitutional. 113 However, if the court finds that the state action
cannot be justified by a compelling state interest or is not narrowly
tailored to meet such an interest, then it will be deemed to have
violated the Equal Protection Clause."1
A traffic stop will be subjected to strict scrutiny if a claimant
can show that the police stopped the car because of the claimant's
race. As discussed above, the police would have to prove that the
11 See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 422 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)
(holding that "[a] racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is
presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justifi-
cation").
.. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-8, 11-12 (1967) (finding a
Virginia statute that prevents marriage between persons of different races
unconstitutional because it violates equal protection). The State of Virginia
argued that it had a right to regulate marriage and that it sought to preserve
racial integrity through the statute. Id. The State also alleged that the statute was
narrowly tailored since no one group was singled out and both whites and blacks
were equally punished under the law. Id. The Court found that Virginia's
interests were not compelling and did not justify racial classifications. Id.
112 Id.
113 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944)
(upholding military order barring people of Japanese ancestry from access to
certain parts of the West Coast because of the compelling state interest of
national security during World War II with Japan).
114 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1949 (1996) (finding Texas
Congressional Districts 18, 29 and 30, which were minority-majority districts,
unconstitutional because they were created primarily with race in mind and could
not be justified by the state's interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act).
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practice of stopping motorists on the basis of race serves a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to that interest 115
While protecting the public from the potential harms of traffic
violations is a compelling state interest," 6 the practice of stopping
only minority motorists for the purpose of finding evidence of
criminal activity is not a compelling state interest. Moreover, even
if traffic safety is accepted as the State's compelling interest, the
practice of stopping only minority motorists is not narrowly tailored
to meet this interest. Stopping minority motorists is both underincl-
usive and overinclusive and thus, does not reasonably achieve
traffic safety."7 In other words, many minorities who do not
commit traffic violations will be stopped while many non-minori-
ties who do commit traffic violations will not be stopped.1 8 Police
" See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (finding a Virginia statute barring interracial
marriages unconstitutional because the state could not identify a compelling
interest to justify the statute).
116 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (holding that traffic
safety is an important government objective).
"7 See generally Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection
of the Laws, CAL. L. R. 341 (1949). Courts, in deciding whether the classifi-
cations in a statute are reasonable, will look to whether the statute is under-
inclusive or overinclusive. Id. "Underinclusive" refers to a statute which seeks
to prevent some harm and thus includes some people in a class suspected of
contributing to the harm, but leaves many citizens out of the class who actually
contributed to the harm. Id. For example, the police practice of using race to
detain motorists will result in the detention of those minorities who commit
traffic violations, but non-minorities who commit traffic violations will not be
stopped.
A statute is "overinclusive" where the class created by the statute includes
individuals who do not contribute to the harm sought to be alleviated by the
statute. Id. Again, where the police stop motorists on the basis of race, minority
drivers who did not commit a traffic infraction may nonetheless be stopped.
' See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) (holding that an Illinois
statute which prohibited picketing at residences, but not at workplaces, was
unconstitutional because it was both underinclusive and overinclusive in that "the
statute discriminate[d] among pickets based on the subject matter of their
expression. . .".); Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding
that a forty-eight hour waiting period and parental consent requirements of the
Illinois Abortion Act of 1977 were unconstitutional in that they were under-
inclusive because they excluded married minors and overinclusive because they
included married, emancipated minors); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390
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Police practices of stopping and searching motorists must be
narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest of ensuring traffic
safety; the practice of stopping motorists because of race is not so
tailored, and thus violates the Equal Protection Clause.
C. Discriminatory Intent: The Insurmountable Requirement
of Equal Protection
Part B laid out the necessary elements of a traditional equal
protection argument and then demonstrated how a claimant could
establish an equal protection violation when the police use race to
decide whom to stop for traffic violations. While the claimant is
able to set forth arguments for each element of an equal protection
claim," 9 there will be one major weakness in the claimant's case,
that is, a lack of proof that the police were acting with discrimi-
natory intent. 2 ' This weakness results from limitations on claim-
ant's use of direct evidence or circumstantial statistical evidence to
prove that the police officer chose to detain the Claimant because
of the claimant's race.
1. Admissions by Police Officers
The best evidence of intentional discrimination by the police in
stopping motorists is the admission by an officer that he or she did
(1978) (holding a Wisconsin statute unconstitutional that prevented any state
resident from marrying where the resident had a child not in his custody and was
obligated to provide support to that child by court order because such a law was
both underinclusive and overinclusive in that the statute did not limit the
applicant's new financial commitments and does not protect children born out of
wedlock).
119 Claimant is able to argue that when a police officer stops the claimant
because of his or her race, state action is involved. See United States v. Jennings,
985 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that law enforcement is one of the most
basic functions of government). Claimant can also argue that while the state may
have a compelling interest (traffic safety), the practice is not narrowly tailored
to justify such an action because it is overinclusive and underinclusive. See supra
note 117 (describing the concepts of underinclusive and overinclusive).
120 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in
proving discriminatory intent).
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in fact detain the motorist because of the motorist's race.'21
However, there is some suggestion that courts may not even give
this evidence weight. 22 For example, in United States v Harvey,
an African-American male was arrested for possession with intent
to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony after being stopped for driving "several
miles per hour" over the speed limit, and for equipment viola-
tions. 123 The defendant claimed that he had been stopped because
of his race and that "no reasonable police officer would have
stopped the car for those violations absent some other motive.''4
When Officer Collardey, the arresting officer, was asked what
prompted him to stop the car, he responded, "[t]he age of the
vehicle and the appearance of the occupants."'' 25 Although it is
unclear what Officer Collardey meant by "the appearance of the
occupants," an inference can be made that he actually suspected the
defendant because of his race. The majority found that the stop of
the defendant's vehicle was proper and that his conviction should
be upheld. 126 The majority addressed the testimony of the officer
in a footnote commenting that "nowhere in that testimony is there
any suggestion that Collardey's use of race was a 'but for' cause
of the stop.' 27 The dissent, written by Judge Keith, vehemently
disagreed. He wrote:
In my twenty-six years as a federal judge, although I have
suspected discrimination by police officers, I have never
heard an officer admit he stopped an individual based on
the color of his skin .... The majority's willful disregard
121 See generally Brendan Mangan, Comparable Worth Claims Under Title
VII: Does Evidence Support An Inference of Discriminatory Intent?: AFSCME
v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991), 61 WASH. L. REv. 781, 797-98
(1986) (writing that in Title VII cases involving discriminatory pay practices, the
best evidence of intentional discrimination is an admission by the defendant).
122 See Magee, supra note 39, at 179 (discussing the Supreme Court's recent
policy of affording police officers great deference in their judgments).
123 16 F.3d 109, 110 (6th Cir. 1994).
124 Id. at 111.
125 Id. at 113 (Keith, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 112.
127 Id. at 112, n.3.
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of the flagrant discriminatory treatment in this case
endorses a system where one set of traffic regulations
exists for African-Americans like myself, and a more
lenient set exists for white Americans. 2 '
Thus, Harvey suggests that courts may not even find discriminatory
intent where an officer admits that he stopped a car because of the
race of the occupants.' 29 The question remains, if the Supreme
Court is unwilling to accept this type of evidence, what evidence
will it require to fulfill the discriminatory intent requirement? 3 '
If the claimant does not have available direct evidence that the
officer selected the claimant due to his or her race or if the court
does not accept such evidence, then the claimant must rely on other
evidence.
2. Statistics as Sufficient Proof of Discriminatory Intent
There is some doubt as to whether courts will discern discrimi-
natory intent on the basis of statistics alone. '3 The cases seem to
121 Id. at 114.
129 In Harvey, the court was addressing whether the traffic stop violated the
Fourth Amendment, not the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 109-10.
"0 For example, Title VII cases often do not require the claimant to prove
intentional discrimination on the part of an employer. The Supreme Court
recognized the difficulty in providing direct evidence to show an employer's
intent to discriminate and thus laid out the requirements of a prima facie case
which do not require a showing of discriminatory intent. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). Further, the Supreme Court
approved of the use of statistics to show a pattern and practice of discriminatory
intent. Id. In addition, in a Title VII action of a former employee against her
employer for racial discrimination, the Court reaffirmed "[t]he principle that
some facially neutral employment practices may violate Title VII even in the
absence of discriminatory intent." Watsonv. Ft. Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 988 (1988). Further, the Supreme Court has found that a requirement by the
employer that all applicants and employees pass an intelligence test was
discriminatory and that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
... For example, in United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996), the
defendant alleged a selective-prosecution claim and offered a study which
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suggest that the courts usually find defects in the statistics offered
by defendants, thus rendering this evidence ineffective.'32 For
example, in United States v. Bell, the defendant was charged with
possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute after a stop by
local police officers for operating a bicycle without a headlight.33
The defendant contended that his arrest was invalid because it
violated the Equal Protection Clause.'34 He offered statistics
showing that "the only people arrested for violating the statute [of
operating a bicycle without a headlight] during a certain month
were black . . ,.3. In addition, he had a bicycle shop owner
testify that 98% of bicycles operated in the area (which is popu-
lated predominantly by whites) did not have headlights.'36 In
rejecting this claim, the court explained that the statistics relied
upon by the defendant were incomplete. The court stated that the
defendant needed to show that white bicyclists also violated the
statute and that the police chose not to arrest them.'37 The court
further stated that the defendant needed to show the number of
white bicyclists who ride their bicycles between sunset and
sunrise. 3 ' Bell is an example of how the courts usually do not
find statistics adequate to prove discriminatory intent.
showed that during the prior year, in all 24 cases handled by the federal public
defender's office involving similar drug charges, the defendant was black. The
Supreme Court found this evidence insufficient and instead stated that defendant
should have additionally offered proof of individuals who were not black and
could have been prosecuted for the same offenses but were not charged. Id. at
1489.
132 SeeUnited Statesv. Jennings, No. 91-5942, 1993 WL 5297, at *4-*5 (6th
Cir. Jan. 13, 1993) (holding that discriminatory intent by the arresting officer,
who admitted that half of the people he stops for searches are African-Americans
and Hispanics, cannot be inferred because the defendant failed to provide
statistical data showing that African-Americans represent a small minority of
passengers). See also United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 372 (1996).
133 Bell, 86 F.3d at 821-22.
134 Id. at 822.






In addition to courts not giving weight to the use of statistics,
a claimant trying to prove discriminatory intent with statistics faces
the problem of gaining access to these statistics.139 First, there are
no national statistics, that is statistics kept by police departments
across the entire nation, available on the percentage of minority
motorists stopped and searched in comparison to white drivers. 4 '
Second, even if local police do keep such statistics, they may not
be willing to turn over such information to claimants bringing equal
protection claims against them.4 For example, the Houston
Chronicle wrote several articles about minority drivers being
stopped and ticketed more often than whites. 42 One such article
discussed the difficulty in obtaining information regarding traffic
violations stating that: "[t]hough driving records are routinely
released to the public by the [Texas Department of Public Safety]
one at a time, the agency refused to release them to the Chronicle
for less than $60 million." '143 This suggests that even if access to
statistics is available, the statistics may not be affordable. Courts
have not been eager to compel states to supply such information to
claimants or to grant them access to such records.'" For example,
the court in United States v. Bullock refused to compel the arresting
officer to produce evidence regarding his past history on stopping
motorists on the basis of race.1 41
A claimant attempting to prove that equal protection is violated
when police stop a motorist on the basis of race has a very difficult
task. The most serious hurdle is establishing that the police acted
139 See Davis, supra note 12, at 438 (discussing the difficulty in obtaining
statistics regarding the race of those motorists stopped by police for traffic
violations).
140 See Fletcher, supra note *, at Al (revealing that national statistics
concerning number of stops by police of minorities are not available).
141 See Fletcher, supra note *, at Al. ("Police departments have varying
policies on compiling and releasing such information.").
142 See Hunt, supra note 30, at 1.
143 See Hunt, supra note 30, at 1.
144 See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1485 (1996) (asserting
that under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the
defendant is not entitled to examine government documents that are material to
the preparation of selective-prosecution claims).
141 94 F.3d 896 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 966 (1997).
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with an intent to discriminate. Direct evidence in discrimination
cases is usually unavailable1 46 and the courts are reluctant to rely
on a claimant's use of statistics to prove intentional discrimi-
nation. 47 Therefore, the traditional equal protection test may not
be sufficient to protect minority drivers from the discriminatory
practices of police. One possible solution is refining the require-
ments for establishing a prima facie equal protection violation.
III. THE NEED FOR A NEW EQUAL PROTECTION TEST
A. The Test Under Batson v. Kentucky and its Application
to Stops of Minority Motorists
One area where the Supreme Court has re-evaluated the
stringent equal protection test is jury selection and the use of
peremptory challenges. 48 The Supreme Court announced this
equal protection test in Batson v. Kentucky,149 thereby overruling
previous decisions which had required proof of specific instances
of discriminatory practices by prosecutors in making their peremp-
tory challenges.'50 Courts should adopt the equal protection test
set out in Batson when analyzing the use of race by police in their
decisions to stop motorists for a traffic violation.
1. The Courtk Findings in Batson v, Kentucky
The issue before the Supreme Court in Batson was whether a
defendant could prove that the State denied him equal protection
when the State used its peremptory challenges to strike members of
,46 See Lamber, supra note 96, at 554.
141 See, e.g, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
148 See Lawrence Elmen, Jr., Note, Peremptory Challenges After Batson v.
Kentucky: Equal Protection Under the Law or an Unequal Application of the
Law, 20 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 481, 492-93 (1994)
(detailing the history of jury selection cases and equal protection).
149 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
1"o See Elmen, supra note 148, at 494 (discussing how the Batson decision




the jury who were of the same race as the defendant.'51 The same
issue had arisen previously in Swain v. Alabama where the
Supreme Court held that in order for a defendant to establish an
equal protection violation, he or she would have to look beyond his
or her own case and establish an extensive pattern by prosecutors
of discriminatory exclusion of a certain race from juries.'52 The
Supreme Court in Batson, however, found fault with this approach
and criticized the effect of Swain stating that: "[s]ince this
interpretation of Swain has placed on defendants a crippling burden
of proof, prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely
immune from constitutional scrutiny."' 3 The Supreme Court in
Batson chose to overrule Swain and set out new rules for estab-
lishing an equal protection violation in jury selection cases.' 54
The Batson Court laid out three elements which must be met in
order to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimi-
nation."' First, the defendant "must show that he is a member of
a cognizable racial group ... and that the prosecutor has exercised
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the
defendant's race."' 56 Second, the defendant is allowed to make
the presumption that "peremptory challenges constitute a jury
selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a
mind to discriminate.' '1 5 7 Finally, the defendant is required to
"show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an
inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the
veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.' 58 To
establish this inference, the court will consider all relevant
circumstances which might include a pattern of strikes against
certain members of a particular race or questions the prosecutor
asked during voir dire.'59
151 476 U.S. 79, 82-83 (1986).
152 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965).
153 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
154 Id. at 100, n.25.
"I Id. at 96-98.
156 Id. at 96.
157 Id.
158 id.
159 Id. at 96-97.
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After the defendant has established these three elements, the
burden of proof then shifts to the State.16° The State is required
to provide some neutral explanation for the exclusion of certain
members of a particular race. 6 The Court specifically stated that
it will not be acceptable for the State to explain its actions by
saying that it believed the potential jury members would be more
sympathetic to the defendant.'62 As one commentator articulated,
the Supreme Court has now shifted its focus away from the "ends"
a prosecutor hopes to achieve and instead looks more closely at the
"means" as to how those ends are achieved. 6 3
2. Why Batson Should be Applied to Cases Where Motorists are
Detained by Police Because of Their Race
The prima facie case for discriminatory intent established in
Batson should be applied to cases where motorists allege that they
have been stopped by police due to their race because the two
situations are analogous. A prosecutor's use of race in determining
who should sit on a jury is comparable to a police officer's use of
race in deciding whom to detain for a traffic violation. In each of
these scenarios, the selection process at issue involves the discre-
tionary power of either a prosecutor or a police officer.' 64 The
attention on members of a particular race usually stems from
stereotypes such as a black juror will be sympathetic to a black
defendant or a black driver is more likely to have an illegal




163 See Elmen, supra note 148, at 493-94.
164 See Williams, supra note 33, at 18 ("State Troopers' abuse of discretion
is routine, and it plagues racial minorities on one of the nations busiest
highways.").
165 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (requiring a prosecutor to
rebut a defendant's claim of discrimination with more evidence than the
prosecutor's intuitive judgment that the juror will be sympathetic to the
defendant because they share the same race). See also Johnson, supra note 38,
at 236 (discussing police officers' assumptions that minorities have a greater
propensity to commit crimes).
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a subjective decision by a state actor that often cannot be clearly
quantified. In both situations, a prosecutor's or a police officer's
race-based decision can be hidden by a pretext.166 Both situations
involve a major infringement upon the civil rights of members of
a particular race, particularly since they both involve criminal
proceedings. 167 The two situations are comparable and thus
should be treated similarly under the law.
3. The Effect of Invoking the Batson Prima Facie Case in
Cases Involving Motorists Being Stopped by Police
Because of Race
The Supreme Court in Batson was able to recognize that,
despite the State's pretextual explanations for its choice in jury
members and peremptory strikes, race played a significant role in
the State's decisions.168 The Supreme Court decided that the best
way to solve this problem is to have the party responsible for the
selection process explain its actions."' As a result of Batson, a
state now has to provide a neutral justification for its challenge of
a potential juror, thereby freeing the claimant from having to prove
the nebulous, subjective intent of the state actor.170 The Supreme
Court finally recognized that unless the heavy burden placed upon
the claimant by Swain was lifted from him, the Equal Protection
Clause would be an empty promise.17 1
166 See Batson, 476 U. S. at 98 (requiring that prosecutors articulate a neutral
explanation of why juror was excused). See also Seely, supra note 14, at A12
("The police use vehicle and traffic violations all the time as the pretext for
stopping people, particularly black people, and particularly in certain neighbor-
hoods.").
167 See Williams, supra note 33, at 20 (arguing that targeting minorities for
traffic violations "abus[es] the civil rights of hundreds of thousands of motorists
to make a handful of arrests for possession of drugs").
161 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
169 Id. at 97.
170 Id.
171 See generally Catherine Beckley, Batson v. Kentucky: Challenging the
Use of the Peremptory Strikes, 15 AM. J. ClM. L. 263, 263-64 (1988)
(discussing how Batson recognized and corrected the shortcomings of Swain).
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Just as in the jury selection cases, it is evident that police are
motivated by race to stop certain motorists for traffic violations. If
the Batson rationale was implemented in cases involving race and
traffic stops, the claimant would have to set forth a prima facie
case and then the burden would shift to the police to have to
explain their decision to stop the motorist."1 With this type of
equal protection test in effect, the burden of proving intentional
discrimination would be removed from the claimant. Instead, the
State would have to explain why the particular motorist was
suspected, other than his or her race, for a violation of the traffic
law. Under this procedural requirement, the Equal Protection
Clause would finally become viable again and would be able to
achieve its original purpose: to protect minorities from harmful
classifications and discrimination on the part of the state.
B. Equal Protection and "Unconscious Racism"
1. Charles Lawrence: "Unconscious Racism" and The Cultural
Meaning Test
Charles Lawrence in his profound article, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, argues that
racism and the Equal Protection Clause should be approached from
a different angle that better reflects the realities of racism in our
culture. 73 Lawrence begins by asserting that our cultural and
historical heritage has been imbedded with notions of racism which
has resulted in all of us being racist to some degree. 74 Most of
us are unable to recognize the extent to which our culture has
affected our ideas about race and thus we are unaware that race
plays a role in our decisions and actions. 75 Lawrence asserts that,
"a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is
influenced by unconscious racial motivation.' ' 76 Notions of
172 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
173 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 321 (1987).





racism are even further suppressed given that recent "American
cultural morality" views racism as wrong.'
Lawrence argues that the concept of "unconscious racism"
should be incorporated into the equal protection analysis. 78 Given
that racism may take a less than obvious form, requiring a showing
of intentional discrimination is not adequate to address the
problem.'79 Lawrence writes: "decisions about racial matters are
influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as
neither intentional - in the sense that certain outcomes are self-
consciously sought - nor unintentional - in the sense that the
outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decision-
maker's beliefs, desires, and wishes." 8' Equal protection analysis
needs to be revisited so that it can better reflect this understanding
of unconscious racism.
Lawrence, in developing the concept of "unconscious racism,"
goes on to articulate a new test that courts should implement in
cases involving racism and equal protection that he calls the
"cultural meaning test." ' The first step in the test is for the
court to "evaluate [the] governmental conduct [in question] to see
if it conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches
racial significance."'8 2 The court, in attempting to make such a
decision, would have to consider the historical and cultural context
in which the suspect conduct occurred. If the court concludes that
a "significant portion of the population thinks of the governmental
action in racial terms," then the decision would be deemed to have
been influenced by "socially shared, unconscious racial atti-
tudes."'8 3 The suspect conduct, thus, would be subjected to strict
scrutiny analysis by the court."8 4
'77 Id. at 344.
178 Id. at 323.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 322.
181 Id. at 324.
182 Id. at 356.
183 Id.
'" Id. For a discussion of strict scrutiny, see supra note 110 and accom-
panying text.
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2. The Cultural Meaning Test Applied to Cases Where Police
Stop a Motorist Because of Race
In applying Lawrence's cultural meaning test to a situation in
which a police officer detains a minority motorist, several factors
have to be considered. Primarily, the court should focus on the
historical and social context in which the traffic stop occurred. The
court should begin by looking at general historical and cultural
stereotypes regarding African-Americans. Throughout history and
continuing to today, African-Americans have stereotypically been
thought of as overly aggressive, violent, involved in drugs,
dishonest, shiftless and lazy, desirous of white women and lacking
in work ethics."' 5 Whites, on the other hand, have been seen as
industrious, intelligent and responsible.186
In addition to these cultural stereotypes, our country has
historically associated crime with race, and still does today. 87
African-Americans are often viewed as being out of control and as
possibly dangerous. 88 There is a commonly held belief that they
tend to commit more crime and thus police are justified in targeting
African-Americans as opposed to other groups. 89 Many feel that
the focus of the police should be aimed at preventing black crime
against white victims because of the dangerous nature of African-
Americans. 9 °
Based on this historical and cultural conduct, an officer who
decides to stop a minority motorist for a traffic violation, clearly
sends a symbolic message latent with racial significance. Given the
extensive coverage by the media and press regarding the prevalence
of minorities being stopped by police for traffic violations,'91 it
185 See Weatherspoon, supra note 37, at 28.
186 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REv.
1945, 1948 (1993).
187 See Jason A. Gillmer, Note, United Statesv. Clary: Equal Protection and
the Crack Statute, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 497, 527-40 (1995).
188 See Roberts, supra note 186, at 1947.
'.. See Roberts, supra note 186, at 1949.
190 See Roberts, supra note 186, at 1946.
191 See supra notes 1-15 (discussing media attention to pretextual car stops
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would not be difficult for the court to find that a significant portion
of the population attributes such police action to racial factors.
After making this judgment, the court would apply the strict
scrutiny standard to the police practice of choosing to detain a
motorist for a traffic violation because of the motorist's race.
192
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held in Whren that under the Fourth
Amendment, a police officer has probable cause to stop a motorist
for a potential traffic violation even if the police officer considers
the race of the driver in his or her decision to stop the
motorist.1 93 The Whren decision essentially prevents any claimant
from arguing that the Fourth Amendment is violated when a police
officer stops a motorist for a traffic violation because of the
driver's race.' 94 Instead, the Whren Court asserted that the appro-
priate remedy for such a problem lies with the Equal Protection
Clause. 195
It is apparent, however, that the current equal protection test
may be inadequate to remedy the problem of drivers being detained
by police officers for traffic violations because of their race. Under
the traditional equal protection test, it will be extremely difficult for
claimants to establish that a police officer acted with an intent to
discriminate against the minority driver when that driver was
stopped for a traffic violation.' 96 The officer is unlikely to admit
based on race).
192 Once the court applies the strict scrutiny standard, the state would be
obligated to show that stopping motorists on the basis of race for traffic
violations meets a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to that
interest. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of strict
scrutiny and its requirements.
"' Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996).
194 id.
... Id. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Whren Court's view that the police
practice of using race in deciding whom to detain for a traffic violation should
be addressed through the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment).
196 See supra Part II.C (discussing the difficulty of proving discriminatory
intent in cases where a police officer has stopped a motorist for a traffic violation
because of the motorist's race).
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that he or she stopped the driver because of his or her race which
leaves the claimant with only circumstantial evidence to prove his
or her case.'97 Claimants may look to statistics as a form of proof,
but it may be impossible for claimants to get access to such studies
and the courts may not accept such evidence.' 98 To remedy the
pervasive problem of stops of minority motorists based on race,
courts should re-evaluate the traditional equal protection test to
better reflect the requirement in Batson or to take into account
unconscious racism as defined by Charles Lawrence.'99 Whether
courts will actually re-evaluate the current equal protection standard
is something yet to be determined. However, we must encourage
the courts to do so in order to fight "DWB. ' 20 0
117 See supra Part II.C. 1 (discussing the lack of admissions by police officers
that they detained a motorist because of the motorist's race and courts failure to
give weight to "couched" admissions).
... See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the lack of weight courts have given to
statistics and the difficulty claimants traditionally have in obtaining them).
1' See supra Part III (discussing the more lenient equal protection test
adopted by the Supreme Court in cases where race was considered in peremptory
challenges in jury selection and other ways in which the equal protection test
could be changed, for example by adopting the cultural meaning test as suggested
by Charles Lawrence).
200 See Fletcher, supra note *, at Al (defining the term "DWB"). See also
David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv.
1283, 1312 (1995) (advocating that the Supreme Court adopt a new equal
protection test regarding cocaine sentencing guidelines and writing, "while the
history of equal protection jurisprudence provides ample grounds for pessimism,
neither history nor morality permits us to give up equal protection law for
dead").
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